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• 
REMARKS OF SENATOR MIKE MA.lil"SFIELD (D., MONTANA) 
THE KOBLITZ ME10RIAL LECTURE 
The Temple 
Sunday Morning, April 30, l967 
Cleveland, Ohio 
CRITICAL COMPONENTS OF CURRENT U. S. FOREIGN POLICY 
Along with rabbis, ministers and priests, a member of the Senate 
is among those most acutely aware of the great range of problems which face 
the nation and give rise to its principal anxieties. Both in domestic and 
international matters, Senators are compelled by their responsibilities to 
chart a course through a maze of disturbing public issues. 
A Senator's guide in this process is a kind of triangle. At the 
base is the United States Constitution. One of the s~-~s is his constituency, 
the other his conscience. For each Senator, the three angles are adjusted 
differently. During any session of Congress, however, all Senators are 
confronted with the need to make decisions which, in the end, are enclosed 
in this triangle. 
A Senator's duties also have a tripartite character. They involve 
a contribution to a responsive Congress in a government which is responsive 
to domestic needs and which governs our relationship with the rest of the 
world by means of a responsive foreign policy. Three of the Senate's 
actions during this session of the Congress are illustrative. 
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t e cnatc, point~ the ~~Y o. 
proced.1.::::es :!..:1 -..,-vo "ec~es. The rc ~s:!..O:::. extens.:or: o_ 
.ct w-!lich t e Senate o.:pproved is :::. rcspon~e to t 
needs o~ a -=-:.llti-sta:te region left st:::-~n ~ oy t .. c s ifti:l..., ti L:S o_ economic 
dcvelo:pment. Senate consent to r:::.ti.2ication of c. Cons~ Tl·cc.ty wit tl. 
Soviet Union is a res:ponse to ~he President's ef_ort to ring c.~o~t ctter 
relations not only wit' that n~tion but with all of Eastern Europe. 
T ese three oeasures share a co=on chc.ractcristic. In thei.... 
intent, all seek to kee:p pace with chan e. It i::: to t c factor of c angc--
to changes in t e international situation--t~~t ! ~oal f~:::t address your 
attention. In the two decades since ,Jorld. :rar II, \,e • ~ve seen c. drastic 
revision in the political co~position of contine ts. ~!e :::.ve witnessed 
the emergence and growth of t e Unite !~ations and. other intcrnationcl 
groupings of nations . \·le have been almost over~.; elmed by c. r::.c.ss outpouring 
of developments in science and technology. \·!'e have been p.es nt at t e 
addition of the nth pm-rer of nuclear weapons to tne already ccu...:plicatc 
equations u:pon vrhich rest vrorld. peace and civilized survival. ~ e ave been 
compelled to face the frightful gaps in the material well-being of the 
world 1 s peoples and to conf'ront the dilemna.s which the rapid growt of 
population poses to efforts to close these ga:ps . 
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The extent of change over the past two decades is also suggested 
in the contrast of the haunted, >Tar- ravaged Europe of 1946 and the glittering, 
assertive Europe of 1967. It is sensed in the strivings for human betterment 
throughout Latin America and Africa and in other underdeveloped regions . In 
Asia, the force of change is illuminated by the extraordinary recovery and 
the technological advance of Japan. It is felt in the vast tremors in 
Chinese society. 
It used to be that we were so immersed in change within our ovm 
nation that our concern for change beyond our borders was minimal. Some 
speak of that not so distant time as an age of isolationism. Actually, -vre 
were not so ouch isolated as we were insulated in a much less complicated 
world by an exhilarating national experience and by a fortuitous geography. 
Our energies, fortunately, could be directed largely to the inner develop-
ment of a nation which was as sparsely settled as i t was plentifully endowed . 
There was little need for us to 'look elsewhere for our challenges . The 
changing American frontier - -physical, scientific and economic--was as 
stimulating and as promising of personal fulfillment as any in the world. 
Except to indulge a limited curiosity and to cater to a few exotic wants, 
1ve were inclined to avoid an extensive overseas projection of American 
power. 
He did not seek our present involvement in world affairs . Even 
on the eve of Pearl Harbor, as a nation, lYe -vrere reluctant to accept ._._ l'- • 
Yet, as a sequel to . 'VJorld \·lar II, T.·Te became deeply and irrevocably immersed 
in the affairs of the rest of the world . 
I 
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-· ng ... ..... e h vc ;,..ec trc.:: Oa5 r wOUl"C .. , 
~t:!.o!'l~ pO'~'c ... i -:.o a c-..-.tit e o~ ect vit .... es c.bro 
tote 
bill:!.o~s o:: C.o1 1 .,..,..:; ovc.::- ~ese yc .,..:::; c.n <:.ens o~ t. ousa.n s o_ ~.tt.erico.n., . ve 
gone ab_ oo.C. c.t one t:!..:n"' or ~ot~c:r to cxr:ry O'..:.t tc.o::: pro[jrmn ... . e ho.v 
establis. cd. ·,ridesprcc.d intc.lligcnce ct~ro:r:.:z c.r. :!.~ternet:!.otlD.l :!.nfort:l:lti n 
services. :r e he.Ye a ':!lili U:..ry st-u.ct-..:re ~~::.c=. costs aroun 70 :!.l::.ion each 
yr:.;a:r ; under it:, :::ieee the cu of 'l:orld .~:::..:r II, ::!Ullions of Americ::ms . o.v 
been sect c.b:ro~ . 
~he strategic air fore is on ~ ~inutez-al rt. :ntc~cont~ncntcl 
other oissilcs are fll3ed for ~o:;t 0 ., ... "-u Our no.vy 
is ba:ed in zcat~ered parts o~ t~e globe ~d is o~ co~sta~~ pat~ol of t. 
Seve:1 Sc:::.s. P~rican force::; are stat:io:1e In 
Ea.ro:pe as well as i:1 v:.ct .~.::!::1, t~e le·1cl o:!.' -~:.is deplo~cnt, to "Y, reac. cs 
to hucdrcds of thousa:1ds. 
In t:he t·wo decades s:.:1ce ~~orl.d :~c.:r ::i:I, ou::- a....-med forces hc.vc 
fought i:::. Korea a-c.d nm,r fig!lt in Viet Na.m ::md they have i cu:rr'"'d tens o 
~~ouscnds of ca~ualties in t e proceGs . :!c have s~~ted o~ ~ er~ve co~-
flicts elsc• . .,rncre in P.sia e::ld elce·..:hcre irr fue world . In the Ct:.ba .. confro:1tn-
tion, tQe nuclear clock was stopped at one ~nutc to ~i~igit by c. ztroke 
of wise ~r:.d res~ai-c.e ~iplo~cy. 
I 
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\~e 2:lc.ve entered into so r::any rrr..J.tual security agree:r:ents--so:ae 
fo::-ty pacts-- t::;;..t ve are coJ:.nitted to military action in every part of the 
glo'oe exce:pt, per!:a:ps, Antcr-ct:..ca. The visdor;;. of these far - flung co:::r:nit:nents 
has bee. questioned from time to ti~e, ~d in my judonent, pro:perly so. 
Defense obligations are nov so enomous and so dispers~d that vere the 
operative provisions of a n~ber o~ these co~itments to come into play 
simultaneously, our ability to d:..scharge them, short of nuclear conflagration, 
would be !!lOst doubtful. 
:n my jud~ent, all outstanding l!lilitary co~itments and activities 
ought to be subject to continuous scrutiny as ~o their current validity. 
From time to time we close surplus milita::-y bases at t.ome. \·~e ought not 
to be reluctant, in any sense, to reduce costly co .. ~itr::~nts abroad just as 
ra:pidly as their utility becomes quest~onab~e and t~eir fo::-eign policy :pur-
poses obsolete. 
In this connection, I would note the large u. S. mi~i~ary deploy-
ment in Europe. :?or a number of years, six U. S. divisions have been 
stationed in \. es-c...,:c-n Europe under NA.TO. These forces plus dependents add 
up to a quasi-p~l~anent military establishment in Europe of over half a 
million Amer:..cans. 
The annual outlay for this commitment amounts to billions of 
dollars. .fany have urged a :c-eduction of the deployment on the basis of 
cost or the gold drain and balance of payments difficulties or because of 
the competing needs of Viet Nam. ~he costs of ~~e European deplo~ent, 
/ 
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.:..c ceo 
pon.~ion of tee ollur . 
o_ en p.::t :!.n tcr..-:s cf t.., e rer-t.;ro«in.:; r _ui:!: 
r:.ater:!.el. 
cnt..- for 
_m•<:Ner, t_e c::.-.:t.:cal .:"' .... t.. \lit r .. pcct to the u.S. 
a financial o e; or 
(...tlO.---t 
s it ""c 
cc::peti g :1ecd.:; of Viet -·~· we ::.-eq i.r the present lev 1 of fore w 
:!...1 :Su.rope, the natio-:1 can fi!:O. a way -.;a deal \vith th financial o.n o .... er 
-chc n curity of tb.c :·o~til .• tL...:1tic r ........ -on and t e ~ecur:..ty o_ Uestern 
E'X!:"o!Je- --,;we~:ty yec:rs :rt'-cc.. Eo~:J.C. He.::: =--co:1ti:1u to co ... ::-e: t .e conce:1tr--
-cio~ of six __ eric ... -:1 C.i visio-:1::: on t:,.c oth""r ::::iC!.c of the •• t:act ic. 
_a"t; i:::: i:1volve here: is t c ::ccm o..cy o:: our cu::.-r~:;nt est..:.m t..:s 
of o~c of -.:;he c:::-i-.::ica.l CO!:!!JO~ents of o-...r fo:::-eie;n :policy. Ee n ~d to ........ !: 
ou:::-::::elves i-The1;b.er co!:d.itions in E"..::r-opc h::.v chanueC.. :::..:.nee . ::...'0 v:a.:; 
est-blis!:.ed.. Ue need -co ask o~ selves wn.etb.cr t~c pr~se~t ::. vc: of t_.c 
..O...=~ric~~ cc .... ~i~e!lt is out of s~e::? 11it t~a"t char:zc. 
:_-et us ::at delude ourselve:::; >-rhile ou:::- m.ilitc.:y -C?loymcnt under 
!'~.'::o has not changed for nany yee:::s, circu:n.s".;o..nces in :S.u:ope have chan'-'e"" 
.;ea.tly :!::1 recent yec:rs. They hav~ changed in Russia an !::o..::::t rn E..u-opc. 
T.:...cy ~:;..vc changed in Gerc:;:.ny and \~c::::te::.-n Euro:!_)c. 'Jhc-:1 the troo:p CO!llrr'..itmc~t 
to X::!O \TO..s a.ss\Zl.:=d, the key.:.ote of rcllitions ::,e•.;v;._e~ -c_e Sovie-.:; E ..... st .... nC.. 
/ 
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Vice ?reside~t =~?~~y, o~ retur~i~g fro~ his rtce~t trip to 
~:ester~ Ecro:pe, ~'as quoted as predicting th~t in 20 years tl:!e ::::-m: Cu::tc.in 
1:ouY be replaced vith an open d.oor. t'"b.atcve:::- the situ:::.tion m.c.y i.::>e V:m 
d.ecad.es !J.ence, I venture to suz::e!::t, today, tvo decades afte:::- '\o.'orld. ~Jar II, 
t:tc;t the door is already mu.ch m.orc than slightly ajar, as betvcen ::!:aster~ 
a~ ~Iest;:;rn :::;urope. 
~~e change in the general c~imate in Europe is reflected in the 
attitud.es of the ~.estern Europeans tovm.rd N.A.TO., At one time, the European 
allies joined wit!J. us in a willing pledge of nan::?mler a-:1d. resources to the 
b···nc.ap of ~:_6..~ • Today, the actions of 1:.hc .:..:..::::-;:;c:.·n =~o::?e~n3 spea.k far 
louder than words. The actions suggest that ~hey have :ong since abandoned 
earlier cc~on co~cepts of N.~O force goals, at leas~ insofa:::- as prov~ding 
their share of man~ower and materiel may be involved. 
The French reaction in this respect has been abrupt and to the 
poi~t. Althougl: still ad.hering to tr-.e North Atlantic T:.·eaty, France has 
1vi th<ira~m all divisions and o-cher detachments fro~ ~ffi.TO. Koreover, President 
de Gaulle has required the removal of N.A.TO headquarters from French territory. 
Great Br~tain h~s decreased its co~itment of men and resources -co I~.TO and 
is contenplat~ng a further cutback of its army of the Rhine. Indeed., all 
of the European J~O members, to or:.e extent or anothe::c", have lowered the 
priority they attach to their military consig~ents to the N.A.TO co~nd. 
J 
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D.lli .., to v 
to they ere ccd.._. - e 
gro . C- _n t c ~onvict:o~ t~t tac t.l _n 
&::~OX t t --cl.o c 
lt ~O ~ ~0 
St t .., 
natcrrc of o~ 
o_ ::.ate, 
\f o2..ly i~ac.eq_tu:.tc, i-:; is "co -oe Qe:!: e _.., ~ v leas" o. better 
o. reso::.J.::::;ion 'r!:ich rcco_c,:.....s to -cne Pre..-i e~t -..,_ ~t -.he ~ecutive ""r .... n.._ 
ou t 
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som.e time taat t1m or th!-ee u. S. divisions ~rould be core in accord \·rita 
cur:·ent reali~cies than the six l·rhich a..!"e stationed in EU!:0:9e. The lo,,rcr 
figure uould be no less effective in cx.pD.asizing th""t >·T<; regard tr.e :9ledge 
o:.' rr:utu:ll defense of the ~Jorth Atlantic ~rea"cy as binding and. that vre hold 
our m:.tio::w.l. security as insepa..!"able fro.n t:J.at of \:estern Euro:;>e and the 
Eorth At:::.O.ntic region. 
In all candor, ~ believe there have been strong tendencies to 
inertia in foreign policy, under Democratic no less than Republican ad-
mi~istrations. The ~UcTO situation, as I r~ve just discussed it, is but 
one case in :point. A lc.g is also reflected. in :90liciec -cmra..!"d Eastern 
Euro:9e. Ocly in recer::c yeG:!."s have these policies begun to take cognizance 
of the changes in that rcgion. 
It is t:·ue that President Eisenhauer sougj:J.t in. his ad.mil'listration 
to rev;:..rse so:r.e oi' the excesses of cold war recrioinatior... He tried to 
restore at le~st some civility to the conduct of U.S. - Soviet affairs, for 
example, by his personal association wi"Gh f!.!T. Khrushchev a!:!d otner leaders 
of the Soviet Union. =t is true, too, that during ?resident Kennedy's 
administration, the Nt:.clea.r Test Ban Treaty re:noved a rigidity <rhich for 
years h~d decreed that l:!O a~eements, regardless of how useful, should be 
concluded >·rith the Soviet Union. It has only been in the last year or 
tl·ro, hmrever, that as a nation vTe have opened our eyes to the extent of 
change in ~aste:·n Euro:9e and have begun to explore vigorously its potentiali-
t:.e::;. \:e -.:;end no longer to react vri th an automatic "nyet11 when 0:9portuni ties 
for understanding and mutual advantage a:9:9ear. Rathe, there is a nev sense 
of discernment uhich veig'cls op:!_)O!'tunities in terms of our national interest 
and ~~:9licat~ons ~or a ~ore d~ab_e :peace. 
/ 
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... c.ct. i ... t ..... t s .... c •• ti 
tir::.e re~~t ~ot only of c~ 
...... u t\aie., o ... tru..t ret).on to ere..... ~;;.., 
scni... in t e COUvin ~w ~w a ~e\eiC 0 e. 
r:!. •elries, 'ar-born vend tta.s, ideological. p , r .:i_ oco.l 
ru d t~e inner n.b ... o:::-ptior.. of . tear.. enera i or cr to t t.le tJ." ... t 
o_ s~-viv~ and r co~ ... ~uctic~ w ic~ exi ... t~~ in enc war-... ttcr r io ... 
.. ftcr -.:. e d n.th o~ talin, .. c· eva:, t cr ... w .... w a enera..... 
o=- stte.it~ack~t~ throuL)lout :..astcn Europe. T.nis o..cvelo_ 
in various wcyc end notat:y in t~e gro;_ne rc ... _onsc to con ~ern~~ ... on t 
:p~t of t'. Co ........ c.r.~st ._,overr,.m nt.... -r.e so.tic.e.c'tion of these IJ.et;.:J..,, in tt.rn, 
i vo:vc~ e.'{!?~C .... J • .: co...... ·ce vri El...ro_ e 
vn.c quic:!:'.: to ;.rc::.-.!ome ::.·c. 
dccaC.c has be... -.,~-y :pror..o . .mc d. ) oreover, that--
Bcr2..in .•a:.J. notvrithstar> ..... dn:;--:· st Germany leads a.C. ot.1cr no.:.-Co....._..:.mi.,t 
r .... tions in COm;:J.2:'Ce :~o: .::t!: the Sovie·.:; Union c.on ~~tc.::: .. 
also ".J en a ::-a.;?i growth o~.' co~u:~icatio s, tr ... v ... l, c...:..u..II'u.... c~c .• c. e n:... 
other con-: ... cts be~reen :: ... s~e::-n an.i :J ..Jtern Europe :!.n t..e ::.as u _mr years. 
How far t .• is process has gon ... _s i .d.ico..t ..... ';)y a r .... -.! ..... nt Yu....,o ... ::C.v 
se ~ ... c-.:s of chan~ in ~op ~-c~ for tn~m ... elv s. r .... 
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Ou:1 ~e~ctio~ to change in ~ope includes the i~itial achieve~en~s 
of Pres:!.de~t ~:..se!lhc~r~ ar-ci P::--es:..c.e~:t Ker:!:ed.y to vr:'!ic I have aJ.re::td.y al:_u.d.ed, 
cJibaY~-ed.. ~·!hat is involved. :.n t::C.e 1"-tte:::- caze :.s a sustained e~i'ort in ~he 
di:::' .... ;!tion o~· r.::!s-corin:::; no~a2.cy to our rel....:tior..., uit~ the Soviet Union and 
othe:::- ~as-c~·n Suro~can nations. At the s~e ti~e, the ~:esiQent is see~ing 
c. signi~icant reduction in the nilitary-technological rivalry -.r~ich, -:·rittingly 
or umrittingly, could lead tb.e vorld in·co a catastropnic con:.'lict. 
A n~ber o~ s:.gn~Ticant a~ec~cn~s 1rith the Soviet Union are 
a~eady associated idth this ei'fort. 'I'hey de~ vrit:Cc cult1-.·a1 exchanges, 
consular ~uestions, co~erci~ aviation, and ~2e ~eacc:~ use of outer 
:re.::;otiatious nave bee:: i:.c.i·ciated -cc -cr~' ·.:;o ·c:'Ce incredibly 
costly ar::1s co:rrpeti·cion of adding successive a::J.d reciprocal •:a.ntis" to the 
ballistic rr.issile systens of each nation. ~fos"t. recently, as I have noted, 
a Consu.lar 'l'reaty ;vit"!.:l. t~e Soviet Union has been ratified ar..d just a :":er,r 
days ago by a vote of 83 to 0 ·che Sen.ate consented to the ratE'icution of 
a treaty on the pea~eful use of outer space. 
:::::1otions run dee~ on ~Y q_uestion of U. S. :;:""ela"cions 1-ri th the 
Co~unist nations, especially in the lig:C.t of t~e b:.oody conflict. in Viet 
I am frar..k to say that I have my mm reticences in this connection. 
':::'he ~u::-suit o:: ag;ccenents 1-rith na-cion.s of Baster:1 :2t.:.:.:"ope see::r;.s incor..gr-uous 
vrL;h -;;he uar that is being r,raged aga:.nst us Hitb. the:.r hel;;> on the othe:::-
side o:: ·che globe. The best jud.gments r,re can obtain, hmreve~, tell us that 
I 
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the rejection of e kinds of agreCII'.ents ..,. ic. ave bee e or proj 
with the Soviet Union and other Eastern European countries vill not c c e 
slightest difference in the military situation in Viet • am1 th t it vill, n 
no way, diminish our casualties or hasten the concl sion of the conflict . 
In those circumstances, I do not see that it serves our pur one 
to turn our backs on agreements vhich vould othervise be in t e interentG 
of this nation. I do not see that ve advance the general cause of peace by 
refusing to build more stable relations whenever a.nd wherever an opportunity 
to do so is presented. 
If the changes in Europe constitute one of the critical componentz 
of the situation with which United States foreign policy must concern itGelf1 
a. second is to be found in Asia.. Along the littoral of the Western Pacific, 
there looms the unspoken but no less profound confrontation with China across 
the states of Korea, Japan, Taiwan and Viet Nam. 
In that region, we have yet to resolve the dilemmas of policy which 
were posed by the overthrow of the national government on the Chinese mainland 
almost two decades ago. That cataclysmic event compelled the complete re-
casting of our relations with Cnina.. In the space of a few postwar years, 
the framework of our relations with the Chinese central government altered 
from one of great intimacy to one of great hostility. The Russians replaced us 
in the role of friend and mentor in the formulations of policy wh1cu were 
una.ertaken by the Peking People's Republic. 
.. 
I 
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Cast in the role of foreign devil by the new government in Peking~ 
our policy towards the mainland became a non-policy. Of necessity, we 
settled back to "wait and see. 11 And through the administrations of three 
Presi4ents, we have continued to look for the happening which has not 
happened. We have yet to see clearly either a way to put together the pieces 
of the policy which collapsed years ago or a way to begin afresh in our re-
lations with the Chinese mainland. 
Contacts between ourselves and the Chinese mainland have dwindled 
almost to the point of non-existence. Americans do not go there; mainland 
Chinese do not come to the United States.· At intervals, U. s. diplomats 
have had significant encounters with Peking spokesmen on various issues. 
In 1950, for example, we faced Chinese Communists at the United Nations, 
on the issues of the Korean conflict. We sat down with the Chinese again 
at the Geneva Conferences of 1954 and 1962, on the issues of Indo-China. 
One channel of continuing diplomatic contact with the Peking 
government has been maintained for many years. It has consisted of regular 
meetings, first in Geneva and then in Warsaw between the United States and 
Chinese Ambassadors accredited to Poland. These conversations--brief 
encounters, perhaps, would be a better term--have occurred with great 
regularity but not, to my knowledge, with results of any real :import. 
The absence of travel and diplomatic exchange between China and 
the United States has been accompanied by a mutual abstention from other 
customary international relationships, notably those of trade. The fact 
I 
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is that as a matter of official policy, we have wonted no part of trade with 
China . That is a policy which did not begin vith the new bitterness generated 
by Viet Nam . It is more than a decade old. We are the only nation in the 
vorld, so far as I am aware, which has sougb.t for years to enforce not only 
a primary boycott on Chinese exports but also a secondary boycott on re-
exported Chinese products . 
If the original seeds of hostility were sown, as noted, in China's 
great revolutionary upheaval, they came to fruition in the Korean conflict 
in which thousands of casualties were inflicted on each side. That bloody 
clash was followed by a near conflict over the Chinese islands of Q.uemoy 
and Matsu in the Taiwan Straits. Now, once again, in Viet Nam the unresolved 
hostility with China threatens to bring about another bloody military engage-
ment between ourselves and the Chinese. 
In the light of this succession of clashes and near clashes in the 
Western Pacific it is not surprising that we are still pursuing a policy of 
"wait and see." Moreover 1 events inside China have supplied additional 
blocks to the formulation of positive policies on China. We see these events 
not firsthand, of course, but second and third-hand. However incomplete this 
view may be, it is still sufficient to tell us that the Chinese have entered 
the ranks of those nations with the capability of inflicting nuclear devasta-
tion . It is evident, moreover, that there is in progress even row a great 
ideological strife which gnaws at the inner core of Chinese Communism. The 
I 
I 
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epithets and the accusations and the protest-marches and the inflammatory 
slogans tell us that political introspection in China is very deep and 
widespread at this moment. Its impact is being felt particularly in the 
coastal cities which historically have housed strong Western influencesand 
in the provinces along the inner borders which have '':Long felt the pull of 
the Russian presence. 
Ironically, the Soviet Union has now joined the United States 
as anathema in the policies of the Peking government. The origin of Sino-
Soviet difficulties can be traced historically to the imperial projection 
which carried Russian influence under the Czars across the Asian mainland 
into Alaska and as far as California and Hawaii before it began to retract. 
Over the centuries there have been Sino-Soviet clashes in the border regions 
of Manchuria,Mongolia, and Sinkiang. Indeed, wherever there is a convergence 
of the interests of China and Russia across · the expanses of the tribal lands 
of c ·entral Asiayancient antagonisms have periodically been reactivated. In 
my judgment these historic antagonisms have been a factor second not even 
to ideological differences in contributing to the bitterness and estrange-
ment in Chinese-Soviet ~elations over the past several years. 
However serious the current difficulties, we ought not to indulge 
ourselves with the expectation that they will solve our problems in Viet 
Nam or Asia. Recent developments concerning the supply of materiel to 
North Viet Nam underscore~J this point. In spite of the bitter antagonism, 
the Soviet Union and China have managed to work out an agreement which insures 
I 
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the transshipment of Soviet supplies by way of China to orth Viet Na.m. The 
prospect would appear to be, moreover, for a diminution rather than an intensi-
fication of Sino-Soviet antipathies at this time. Indeed, in the absence or 
basic changes in the situation, the level of interdependence between Russia 
and China is likely to continue to rise the longer the Vietnamese conflict 
persists . 
In any event, we are restrained by the "wait and see" approach 
from making a.djustmeuts of policy which would take cognizance of changes 
in the Sino-Soviet situation. I might add that we have waited for years, 
but it is doubtful that we see our way any more clearly today with respect 
to China than we did a decade and a half ago. China remains a puzzlement 1 
compounded of its immense complexity and our profound bewilderment. It is 
not likely that events in China will ever fall, like Chinese checkers, into 
some simple pattern which will make it easy for ~ to develop a new policy 
with respect to the Chinese mainland and its three-quarters of a bill1on 
people. Whatever course we follow will.involve a great measure of un-
certainty and a high degree of risk . 
That is true for our present course or, more accurately, the 
non-course . Have we dared to ask ourselves, for example, whether or not 
the ten or fifteen years in which policy has been in abeyance in regard 
to the Chinese mainland might bear some responsibility for the tragedy in 
which we are presently involved in Viet Nam'l 
I 
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 43, Folder 63, Mansfield Library, University of Montana
- 17 -
Let me turn, then, to that tragedy 1 to Viet Nam. It is the 
critical focus of this nation's present anxieties. It commands the atten-
tion of the Administration and the Congress almost to the exclusion of other 
pressing issues. Abroad, Viet Nam affects every aspect of our foreign re-
lations. As for relations with Europe, the involvement in Viet Nam narrows 
the scope of response to significant change. As for relations with the 
Chinese mainland, the involvement in Viet Nam vastly complicates the difficul-
ties which have long been present. Moreover, with every military escalation 
we are brought closer to another military involvement with China. 
It is ironic that a small country whose name, Viet Nam, was scarcely 
known in the United States twenty years ago has bec,,ome a critical component 
of the nation's international affrurs. It is ironic that we are engaged on 
China's border with one of China 1 s "natural enemies" but also with a people 
for whom we have no tradition of hostility. It is ironic that this phenomenon 
has occurred twice in less than two decades, the other occasion being, of 
course, Korea. 
One indication of the depth of our involvement in Viet Nam is the 
great concentration of United States military forces in the Southeast Asian 
region. On the ground in South Viet Nam there are 'now more than 430,000 
American forces. In the waters, offshore, there are the additional 75 1 000 
men who compose the 7th Fleet .. Another 35 1 000 American soldiers are stationed 
in Thailand, performing duties which are largely connected with the situation 
in Viet Nam. In total, then, well over half a million of our armed forces 
are consigned to the Vietnamese conflict, along with massive amounts of 
supplies and equipment. Theae forces are backed by powerful elements 
of American military strength in Okinawa, the Philippines and Gilam. 
0 
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A year and a half ago, I returned from Viet Nam a.OO. reported to 
Congress and the President that we were engaged in wnat was, in effect, an 
open-ended war whose conclusion was not in sight. At that time, the commit-
ment of U. S . forces had not yet reached 150,000 and the bombing of t he north 
was sharply circumscribed. A few days ago, the Commander of the United States 
forces in Viet Nam, General WestmorelAnd, told a convention of the Associated 
Press: "I do not see any end of the war in sight." In the months between 
these two comments, there has been the immense increase both in the U. S . 
manpower commitment and the level of military violence . The war 1 however 1 
remains open-ended; there is not in sight any military way to a conclusion 
which bears a rational relationship to the original purpose for which the 
commitment was undertaken. It will be recalled that that purpose was to 
help the people of South Viet Nam preserve ·their freedom of political choice 
and to assist them and all the people of Southeast Asia to build a better 
material life for themselves . 
However it may eventually be brought to an end, it seems to me 
that the war in Viet Nam is not going to be resolved by personal criticism 
such as that which, from time to time, has been aimed at the President, the 
Vice President, Ambassador Goldberg and others . Nor, may I say, will it be 
resolved by the stifling of the constructive debate of differences in or out 
of the Senate . Differences of viewpoint, responsibly arrived at and responsi-
bly expressed, in my judgment, are essential to a solution in Viet Nam. 
Restrained and thoughtful debate of policy is not a luxury, it is a necessity. 
Insofar as President Johnson is concerned, he is opm to any 
suggestions which may emerge from discussion and debate and which may hold 
some promise of peace . He knows as do we that the crucial question is not I 
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how this war began but how this war can be ended at the earliest possible 
moment and in an honorable manner. An honorable ending is not going to be 
brought about by simplistic formulas such as "get all the way in" or ~'ge·t 
all the way out. 11 An honorable ending is not going to be brought about by 
the spread of military violence, with its attendant tragedy for all Vietnamese, 
north and south, for ourselves, and for all concerned. 
President Johnson's concern with this tragedy is as deep as yours 
or mine--deeper perhaps because he has to live with it twenty-four hours a 
day. The ultimate responsibility is his and, for him, there is no surcease . 
Insofar as the Senate is concerned, there are ma.ny viewpoints on 
Viet Nam, but there is Ufianimity on the cles:l..rs.bility of a. prompt ending of 
this war in an honorable peace. Indeed, a few weeks ago by a vote of 89 to 2 
the Senate endorsed a continued search by the President am others for a 
negotiated settlement of the conflict. 
As for myself, I have expressed the view many times that the only 
practicable course is one which seeks to contain a further spread of the 
conflict in Asia, one which seeks to limit our involvement in the conflict 
while the effort to achieve an honorable settlement is intensified. The 
failures so far to find the formula which might lead to negotiations, in. 
no sense, divests us of the obligation to ourselves, · to the Vietnamese people 
and to the world to continue the search. 
To that end, many suggestions have been made. Over the past year . 
or so, for example, I have publicly proposed the following: 
I 
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l. Military emphasis should be placed on sealing off of the 
northern border of South Viet Nam at the 17th parallel by the construction 
of a line of defense which could be maintained largely by South Vietnamese 
forces as an alternative to the continued bombing of the north . 
2 . The reconvening of the Geneva Conference on the basis of the 
1954 and 1962 agreements, by call of the co-chairmen, the United K1nE¢.om 
and the Soviet Union, or by any other participants; 
3· The holding in Rangoon or Tokyo or in any other suitable place ot 
an all-Asian conference to consider the conditions of a11 honorable peace in 
Viet Nam; 
4 . The inclusion in a peace conference on Viet Nam of any and all 
governments or groups 'Whose concurrence may be necessary to bring about an 
end to the conflict; 
5. The broadening of the Manila. Conference of 1966 to include 
Cnina and other non-participating nations in Asia; 
6 . Tne arrangement of a face-to-face meeting of Secretary of 
State Dean Rusk and tne Foreign Minister of the Peking government to dis-
cuss the restoration of peace in Viet Nam. 
In addition, I have suggested that our policymakers examine wi til 
great care, the views expressed by the French government, as well as by the 
Cambodian leader, Prince Norodom Sihanouk . I have urged that the proposals 
of U Thant and Mrs . Gandhi receive consideration. I have endorsed various 
statements of the President, Secretary Rusk, and Ambassador Goldberg, all 
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of which have made clear that not only our proposals but also those of 
Hanoi and the People •·s Liberation Front might provide a basis for settle-
ment. I have recommended that there be not just a cessation of the bombing 
of North Viet Nam but a general cease-fire and standfast, with a halt on 
both sides, to maneuvers on the ground, in the sea, and in the air, to the 
end that efforts might be made to initiate talks. 
Many others in the Senate and elsewhere have offered suggestions. 
There has been no lack of proposals. Many have been pursued through the 
channels of traditional diplomacy. The distinguished Secretary-General of 
the Unite~ N~tions1 U Thant1 has been a central fisure iu tqese secret 
diplomatic efforts to bring about peace. In spite of his great efforts 
and those of other diplomats and men of good will, peace is no closer. 
This factor has led me to question an apparent reluctance to bring 
into play the more formal machinery of the Charter of the United Nations in 
an effort to break down the barriers to peace. I question this reluctance f 
again today. The fact is that the U. N., to date, has not even taken 
official cognizance of the existence of a conflict in Viet Nam. That sort 
of ostrich•approach seems to me to court for the organization irrelevancy 
at best and eventual disaster at worst. 
I do not believe anyone has a right to eXpect, with respect to 
Viet Nam, a miracle of peace from the U. N. I do believe, however, that the 
peoples of the world have a right to expect some public indication of conoenn 
of member nations, as to the dangers of this conflagration. There is a 
right to expect, at least, some effort to use the machinery of the Charter 
to dampen down the flames in Viet Nam before the war goes entirely out of 
control. 
• 
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There are, of course, great difficulties involved in t he a ssumpt i on 
of an active role by the U.N. with respect to VietNam. Two of the princ i pal 
parties concerned--North Viet Nam and Conmunist China--for example, are not 
members of the United Nations. That does not foreclose, however, a contribu-
tion from the U.N. It has seemed to me entirely appropriatea::::=a:z~Q::;a 
that at the very least, the U.N. should open its forum to discussion of the 
problem by all involved directly or indirectly in Viet Nam--members and non-
members alike. Such a procedure is proper; it is precedented; it is not 
subject to veto. There is no reason, so far as I can see, why the Security 
Council cannot offer to bring together not only the member states who are 
most intimately concerned in the situation--that is, the United States and 
the Soviet Union--but also the non-members, that is, Connnunist China, North 
Viet Nam, the government of South Viet Nam and any other group of relevance 
to a peaceful settlement • I should think, too, that the Security Council 
might also consider requesting the International Court of Justice to render 
an advisory opinion on the Geneva Accords of 1954 and 1962. All of the 
belligerents have made reference, from time to time, to these Accords as 
the basis for a peaceful settlement. Certainly, it is appropriate to try 
to see through the impartial and judicious eyes of the Court what the 
applicability of these agreements may entail in present circumstances. 
Let me make clear that I suggest the pursuit of peace through the 
U.N. Security Council not in lieu of private or secret diplomacy, not in 
lieu of a revival of the Geneva Conference. Rather, I suggest it as a 
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supplement or precipitant of these approaches or any other which may hold 
some promise of a solution. 
As I have noted, the effort has been made since the outset to 
find a pathway to peace through secret and traditional diplomacy and it 
has been unsuccessful. Therefore, I think there is everything to be gained 
and nothing to be lost at this t:ime by a public search before the U. N. for 
the gaps between the positions of the belligerents and the means by which they 
may be bridged. 
There is no assurance that a resort to the procedural machinery 
of the United Nations will produce any more significant results than those 
yielded by secret and traditional diplomacy. That will not be known, however, 
unless and until the approach is tried. 
Insofar as this nation is concerned, I cannot see that we violate 
our own interests or the interests of any other nat~on by a vigorous pursuit 
of peace at the U. N. Based on the Korean precedents, our government can 
very properly urge upon the Security Coune>il a vote on these two specific 
resolutions pertaining to Viet Nam: 
One, that the Secretary General be instructed to invite 
governments and groups directly and indirectly involved in the Vietnamese 
conflict, including China and North Viet Nam, to participate before the 
Council in an open and unl:imited discussion of the conflict; 
Two, that the Security Council request the International 
Court of Justice to render an advisory opinion on the current applicability 
of the Geneva Accords of 1954 and 1962 and the obligations which these agree-. 
menta may place on those directly or indirectly involved in the Vietnamese 
9onflict. 
1 
I 
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 43, Folder 63, Mansfield Library, University of Montana
- 2 
In closing, may I emphasize that the responsibility for the cocd.uct 
of our nation's foreign affairs is vested in the President of the United 
States . Whether ve agree vith him or disagree, vhether he pleases or dis-
pleases us, vill not lighten one iota the onerous burdens vhich rest on his 
shoulders as a result of the Vietnamese conflict. The President ma.y look 
for advice to his aides in the Executive Branch . He ma.y look to the Senate 
and to the people of this nation. Whether or not advice is forthcoming, 
wether or not there is consent to his course, the President still must 
decide vhat he believes to be in the best interests of the United States. 
That is his responsibility. He cannot share it--he can only assume it, on 
behalf of all of us. 
The President needs and should have our understanding, our help 
and prayers, and the support vhich can be given to him in good conscience. 
It ou~t to be borne in mind at all times that vhatever contribution this 
nation can make to a peaceful settlement in Viet Nam, that contribution can 
only be made and vill be made on behalf of all of us, in the end, by the 
President of the United States . 
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